Background
A global automotive manufacturer was commissioning a new EV battery assembly line at their flagship production facility. The line featured 142 robotic controllers, vision inspection systems, and automated guided vehicles, all integrated with the plant's Manufacturing Execution System (MES) and connected to enterprise SAP for real-time production tracking.
During a routine network scan by the IT team, they discovered that every new device on the battery line had been connected to the existing plant network with factory-default configurations, no segmentation, and no access controls. With the production launch date eight weeks away and contracts tied to delivery milestones, delaying the timeline was not an option.
The plant's VP of Manufacturing engaged Beacon Security to establish a security baseline in parallel with production commissioning.
Note: All identifying details have been removed to protect client confidentiality.
The Challenge
Automotive production environments present a unique combination of OT security challenges:
Scale and Complexity of New Equipment The battery assembly line alone introduced 142 new OT devices from six different system integrators. Each integrator had configured their equipment independently with no common security standard applied during installation.
Just-in-Time Production Constraints The plant operated on a just-in-time model where unplanned stoppages carried a cost of approximately $2.3M per hour. Any security measure that risked disrupting robotic cycle times or PLC scan rates was unacceptable.
Bidirectional MES/ERP Integration The MES integration created data flows in both directions between the production floor and enterprise SAP. Production orders flowed down; quality data, cycle counts, and traceability records flowed up. This created a direct path between the enterprise network and robotic controllers.
Uncontrolled System Integrator Access Five different system integrator teams had active remote access connections to the plant network for commissioning support. Each used their own VPN solution with broad network access, and several had shared credentials among their engineering staff.
Intellectual Property Risk The EV battery assembly process involved proprietary manufacturing techniques and cell formation parameters that represented significant competitive advantage. These parameters resided in PLC programs accessible from the plant network.
Our Approach
Beacon Security embedded a two-person team on-site for the duration of the eight-week commissioning phase, working alongside the plant engineering and system integrator teams.
Phase 1: Rapid Assessment During Commissioning (Weeks 1-2)
We deployed passive monitoring at the network boundary of the new battery line during the first days of commissioning testing:
- Captured all network traffic generated during commissioning test sequences
- Identified every communicating device, its manufacturer, firmware version, and communication patterns
- Mapped all integrator remote access connections and their network reach
- Documented the MES/SAP integration architecture and data flow paths
This was completed without installing any inline devices or generating any network traffic that could affect commissioning tests.
Phase 2: Security Architecture Design (Weeks 2-4)
Working with the plant engineering team and system integrators, we designed a security architecture that could be implemented without requiring re-commissioning of any equipment:
- Dedicated security zone for the EV battery line with controlled conduits to the plant network
- Industrial firewall placement points identified at natural network boundaries
- MES data flow secured through an application-layer gateway in the DMZ
- Consolidated remote access architecture replacing five separate VPN solutions
Critical constraint: all firewall rules and network changes were validated against robotic cycle time requirements. Any rule that added more than 2ms of latency to time-critical communications was redesigned.
Phase 3: Parallel Implementation (Weeks 4-7)
Security controls were deployed in parallel with production ramp-up activities:
- Industrial firewalls installed during scheduled integrator test windows
- Network segmentation implemented progressively, zone by zone, with continuous validation
- Remote access consolidated onto a single hardened jump server with individual credentials and MFA
- OT monitoring sensors deployed and tuned against the commissioning traffic baseline
- Factory-default credentials changed on all 142 devices using vendor-approved procedures
Phase 4: Validation and Handover (Week 8)
Comprehensive validation confirmed:
- All robotic cycle times within specification after segmentation
- All MES/SAP data flows operating correctly through the new architecture
- All integrator remote access migrated to the consolidated platform
- OT monitoring operational with baseline established and alerting configured
- No factory-default credentials remaining on any production device
Key Findings
Critical Finding: Unrestricted SAP-to-PLC Path The MES integration architecture allowed a path from the enterprise SAP environment directly to robotic controllers. A compromised SAP user account could theoretically issue commands to production robots.
Remediation: Application-layer gateway deployed in the DMZ, permitting only structured MES data exchanges with protocol validation.
Critical Finding: Shared Integrator Credentials Two of the five system integrators were using shared VPN credentials among their engineering teams. One set of credentials was found posted in a commissioning documentation folder accessible to all project staff.
Remediation: All shared credentials revoked. Individual credentials issued to each engineer with MFA requirement and time-limited access.
High Finding: Default Credentials on Vision Systems All 28 vision inspection systems were operating with manufacturer default passwords. These systems had network access to quality databases containing proprietary manufacturing parameters.
Remediation: All default credentials changed using vendor-approved procedure. Access control policy implemented requiring individual authentication.
High Finding: Unencrypted Proprietary Data EV battery cell formation parameters were transmitted in cleartext between the MES and PLC programs. These parameters represented significant intellectual property.
Remediation: Encrypted communication channel established for IP-sensitive data transfers.
Outcome
The EV battery line launched on schedule with a complete OT security baseline in place. No production delays were attributable to security implementation activities.
Deliverables Provided:
- Complete OT asset inventory for the battery assembly line (142 devices)
- IEC 62443 zone and conduit architecture documentation
- Industrial firewall rule sets validated against cycle time requirements
- Consolidated remote access platform with individual credentials and MFA
- OT monitoring deployment with baseline traffic profiles and alert rules
- Security handover documentation for the plant engineering team
Post-Launch Results:
- Production ramp-up proceeded on schedule with security controls in place
- Within the first month, OT monitoring detected and blocked an unauthorized remote connection attempt using a decommissioned integrator credential
- The security architecture was adopted as the standard template for three additional EV line deployments at other facilities
- Plant achieved IEC 62443 Security Level 2 for the battery assembly zone
The manufacturer subsequently engaged Beacon Security to develop a corporate OT security standard for all new production line commissioning projects.
Beacon Security provides OT security services for automotive manufacturing environments, from single-line assessments to enterprise-wide security program development. Contact us to discuss your production security requirements.
